Drawing a Line between Terry and Miranda:
The Degree and Duration of Restraint
Katherine M. Swifit

INTRODUCTION

A felon answered the door in his underwear. Three police officers
and three parole officers were there to search his apartment for a gun
on the basis of a tip from his mother.! The police handcuffed him in
the hallway outside his apartment, but told him he was not under arrest; the handcuffs were for his safety and the safety of the officers.
Then they took him inside and asked about the gun, which he told
them was in a shoebox on the table. The police never read the suspect
his Mirandawarnings. Was he "in custody"? Or was this merely a temporary detention?
Mirandav Arizona' held that police may not interrogate a suspect
who has been taken into custody without first issuing the familiar
warnings Investigative stops, valid under Terry v Ohio,' are not subject to Miranda's notice requirements.! Courts have not settled on a
workable rule for determining custody in Terry stop cases. Part of the
problem is that custody cases involve so many factors.! But more important, coercive police behavior that would have required Miranda
warnings in 1966 often is deemed reasonable under Terry today.
This has led to a circuit split over whether coercive Terry stops
constitute Mirandacustody. The First, Fourth, and Eighth circuits hold

t

B.A., BJ. 1998, University of Missouri-Columbia; J.D. 2006, The University of Chicago.
The facts used in this example are drawn from United States v Newton, 369 F3d 659, 663
(2d Cir 2004). Newton had signed a release stating that his parole officer could search his "person, residence and property" without a warrant. Id.
2
384 US 436 (1966). See Cruz v Miller, 255 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir 2001) (stating that "[t]he
cases in our Circuit seem not entirely consistent" and listing potentially conflicting cases where
the circuit did and did not find custody to illustrate that the rule defining custody is unclear).
3
See 384 US at 444-45. See also note 13.
4
392 US 1 (1968) (holding that police may stop and frisk without probable cause so long
as they have a reasonable suspicion that a violent crime is about to be committed).
5
See Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420,440 (1984).
6 See text accompanying notes 27-28.
7 See Newton, 369 F3d at 673, quoting United States v Ali, 68 F3d 1468,1472 (2d Cir 1995):
Some courts have concluded that where an investigatory stop is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, the seized suspect is not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. [Other
courts] have focused on "whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have
I
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that so-called Terry reasonableness means Miranda warnings are not
required, even if the stop was coercive.8 The Second, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth circuits hold that a coercive Terry stop requires warnings

9
but still is deemed a valid Terry stop. This split illustrates a misunderstanding about how Terry and Miranda interact. Courts tend to ad-

dress one piece of the analysis-typically Fourth Amendment reasonableness- and then stop the inquiry without also asking whether the
police conduct in question, although perhaps reasonable, violates a
suspect's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda.

This Comment proposes a new approach for determining Miranda
custody in Terry stop cases. It focuses on just two factors: the degree
and duration of restraint.0 The higher the degree of restraint used, the
less time required before a Terry stop becomes Miranda custody; the
longer the detention, the lower the degree of restraint allowed before

such a stop becomes custodial. This approach highlights the fact that a

stop cannot be both valid under Terry and custodial under Miranda.If a
understood himself to be subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated with a
formal arrest."
8
See United States v Pelayo-Ruelas,345 F3d 589,592 (8th Cir 2003) (finding that a suspect
is not in custody when an investigative stop is reasonable); United States v Trueber, 238 F3d 79,92
(1st Cir 2001) (same); United States v Leshuk, 65 F3d 1105,1110 (4th Cir 1995) (same).
9 See Newton, 369 F3d at 673 ("This court ...has specifically rejected Fourth Amendment
reasonableness as the standard for resolving Miranda custody challenges."); United States v Kim,
292 F3d 969, 976 (9th Cir 2002) ("[Wlhether an individual detained during the execution of a
search warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that
individual is 'in custody' for Mirandapurposes are two different issues."); Ali, 68 F3d at 1472-73
(holding that whether a stop was permissible under Terry is irrelevant to the Miranda question,
because "Terry is an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, not to the
Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination"); United States v Smith, 3 F3d 1088,
1097 (7th Cir 1993) (noting the "vast difference" between Miranda rights aimed at "protect[ing]
a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment"), quoting Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 241 (1973); United States v Perdue,8 F3d 1455,1464-65 (10th Cir
1993) (holding that a gunpoint stop that was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment nevertheless placed the suspect in custody for purposes of Miranda).
10 This Comment's framework differs from more general Fourth Amendment frameworks,
see, for example, Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 9.1(d) (West 4th ed 2004), in at least three ways. First, the Comment focuses on a narrow range
of police encounters. Fourth Amendment theory generally addresses a wide range of police
encounters to determine the minimal amount of information required at each level of investigation: no information (administrative searches), reasonable suspicion (Terry stops), probable
cause (arrest), or a warrant (generally needed for search of a house, for example). See, for example, id. This Comment considers only the range of encounters between the Terry stop and the
arrest. Second, this Comment does more than take sides. It does not argue only that Miranda
warnings should be required where Terry stops become coercive. It proposes a rule to solve the
problem of when a police encounter crosses that line. Third, this Comment considers two factors,
the degree and duration of restraint, and argues that they are inversely related: more of one
means less of the other is required for a finding of custody. Sliding scales elsewhere in Fourth
Amendment law generally consider the presence or absence of one factor: for example, the
exigency of the circumstances for warrantless searches, probable cause for arrests, or the lack of
a possibility for prosecution in administrative searches.
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stop involves coercive police behavior, then the suspect is in Miranda
custody, which means a de facto arrest has occurred, which requires
probable cause. Police cannot take suspects into custody under Terry
because a Terry stop requires only reasonable suspicion, not probable
cause." This is consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution in Miranda and Terry.2 What is new here is the suggestion that
courts should focus on the degree and duration of restraint, above and
beyond other factors in the custody determination. By focusing on
these two factors, courts should be able to simplify the task of determining Miranda custody.
Part I discusses the evolution of the Miranda and Terry doctrines,

and then analyzes the circuit split over whether Terry stops can rise to

the level of Miranda custody. Part II presents this Comment's ap-

proach, and discusses its positive and normative foundations. This Part
also examines the Supreme Court's de facto arrest cases, which distin-

guish Terry stops and de facto arrests in a way that is analogous to the
distinction between Terry stops and Miranda custody. The distinguish-

ing characteristics in the de facto arrest cases support this Comment's

proposed approach. Finally, Part III addresses potential criticisms of
the proposed approach and concludes that they are outweighed by its

ease of application, potential for creating greater uniformity and predictability among the circuits, and faithfulness to the original purposes
of Mirandaand Terry.

I. THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING CUSTODY
This Part discusses the custody test that has evolved from Miranda

and the expansion of the Terry doctrine. It then examines the circuit

split over whether Terry stops can be custodial under Miranda. This
spilt exemplifies the difficulty lower courts have had applying the custody test. The difficulty seems to arise from a contraction of the range
of encounters where Miranda applies, coupled with the expansion of
11 See 392 US at 26-27 (explaining that the brief detention required to carry out a limited
search for weapons is justified on less than probable cause, but noting that such a detention is
very different from "taking a person into custody," which does require probable cause). See also
California v Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1125 (1983) (finding that custody consists of "a formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest"); Dunaway v
New York, 442 US 200, 208-09 (1979) (discussing the probable cause requirement for "the kind
of intrusion involved in an arrest," and explaining that the kind of intrusion involved in a Terry
stop-and-frisk is "a sui generis rubric of police conduct" involving less than probable cause)
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v Richardson, 949 F2d 851, 858 (6th Cir 1991)
("The general rule is that 'a police confinement [that] ...goes beyond the limited restraint of a
Terry investigatory stop may be constitutionally justified only by probable cause."'), quoting
United States v Royer, 460 US 491,496 (1983).
12 See Miranda, 384 US at 479; Terry, 392 US at 26-27.
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the use of Terry. Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances nature
of the test makes it a vague, ad hoc standard.
Mirandawas meant to create a bright line rule to prevent coerced

confessions. Terry was meant to create an exception to the probable
cause requirement for searches and seizures that allows law enforcement officers to protect themselves. It makes sense to maintain separate doctrines because they address different constitutional concerns,
but courts should address how they operate together when the facts of
a case implicate both.
A. The Evolution of Miranda'sCustody Test
Miranda held that the privilege against self-incrimination begins

with custodial interrogation. Miranda warnings must be given at that
moment; " otherwise, incriminating statements elicited afterwards cannot be used against the suspect in court. Miranda defined "custodial

interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way."" The Court focused on
what should happen after suspects are taken into custody." The Court
did not articulate the indicia of custody, or otherwise help courts (or
police) to determine the steps leading up to custody.
1. Contraction of the Mirandadoctrine.
After Miranda, the Court has interpreted "custody" and "custodial interrogation" narrowly. A suspect is not in custody when he voluntarily goes to a police station alone to answer questions." A suspect

13

See Miranda,384 US at 444-45:

Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
14

See id at 444.

15 Id (emphasis added).
Miranda was questioned by police officers "in a room in which he was cut off from the
16
outside world," and his questioning involved "incommunicado interrogation" in a "policedominated atmosphere." Id at 445. The problem, the Court said, is that even without employing
brutality or the "third degree," "the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on
individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals." Id at 455. The Court explained that
"such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." Id at 457.
17 See Oregon v Mathiason,429 US 492,495 (1977).
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is also not in custody when he voluntarily accompanies police to a

police station to answer questions.'"
The Supreme Court's current formulation of the custody test asks
"whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."'9 This articulation,
taken from California v Beheler,'° is narrower than Miranda's "de-

prived of his freedom of action in any significant way" definition of
custody.' Further limiting what counts as custody, the Court has held
that "the initial determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."" An officer may forgo the warnings and pose as a cellmate to
trick an incarcerated suspect into confessing to a crime: "Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise
to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within
Miranda'sconcerns.""

Lower courts have developed riffs on the Supreme Court's custody test, without distinguishing carefully among the various formulations or explicitly concluding that each formulation amounts to the
same kind of conduct. Some courts conflate the so-called "free to leave"
test with Beheler's "restraint associated with arrest" formulation, as if
they are different descriptions of the same test." Some courts acknowledge these tests conflict, noting that "not being free to leave"
captures more situations (and is therefore broader than) "being re18 See California v Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1125 (1983). The Court has attempted more
specificity in defining "interrogation"; in Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291 (1980), the Court held
that interrogation is direct questioning or the functional equivalent of questioning that the police
should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. A discussion of the meaning
of "interrogation" is beyond the scope of this Comment.
19 Beheler,463 US at 1125.
20 463 US 1121 (1983).
21 384 US at 444.
22 Stansbury v California,511 US 318,323 (1994).
23 Illinois v Perkins, 496 US 292,297 (1990).
24
See United States v Kim, 292 F3d 969,973 (9th Cir 2002) ("[A] court must, after examining all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, decide whether there [was] a formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.")
(internal quotation marks omitted). As though it meant the same thing, Kim then stated, "[W]e
must determine whether the officers established a setting from which a reasonable person would
believe that he or she was not free to leave." Id at 973-74 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Likewise, the Second Circuit found that the custody determination is based on
"whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood himself to
be
subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." United States v
Ali, 68 F3d 1468, 1472 (2d Cir 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). But at the same time,
"[a]n accused is in 'custody' when, in the absence of an actual arrest, law enforcement officials
act or speak in a manner that conveys the message that they would not permit the accused to
leave." Id, quoting Campaneriav Reid, 891 F2d 1014, 1020-21 n I (2d Cir 1989).
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strained to the degree associated with arrest." These differences reveal confusion about the meaning of "custody."2
2.

The ad hoc nature of the custody test.

Regardless of how they address other aspects of the custody test,
courts consider the totality of the circumstances in making custody
determinations. Those circumstances may include any combination of
the following: (1) the location of the encounter and whether it was
familiar to the suspect, or at least neutral or public; (2) the number of
officers questioning the suspect; (3) the degree of physical restraint
used to detain the suspect; (4) the duration and character of the interrogation; (5) the language used to summon the suspect; (6) the extent
to which the suspect is confronted with evidence of guilt; and (7)
whether the suspect initiated contact with the police." Most courts
conclude their list of factors by pointing out that the list is nonexhaustive and that no one factor is dispositive.2'
This grab bag of relevant factors makes custody determinations
unpredictable and inconsistent. Courts do not agree on which factors
to consider; courts do not even agree on the weight to give individual
factors. For instance, some courts have held that handcuffing a suspect
or drawing weapons on him creates a custodial situation; other courts
have held that such restraints and coercion do not, on their own, yield
custody ° Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty of

25 See United States v Leshuk, 65 F3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir 1995) (rejecting the free-toleave test in favor of the test requiring restraint of the degree associated with formal arrest). See
also United States v Pelayo-Ruelas,345 F3d 589,592-93 (8th Cir 2003).
Courts also seem to disagree about how to address Stansbury's reasonable-person stan26
dard. It is unclear who the relevant reasonable person is: the police officer, the defendant, or an
abstract reasonable observer. See United States v Smith, 3 F3d 1088, 1095-96 (7th Cir 1993)
("Courts will look to several factors in determining the distinction between a stop and an arrest,
among them are the officers' intent, impressions conveyed, length of stop, questions asked and
any search made.") (emphasis added). See also Andrew V. Jezic, Frank Molony, and William E.
Nolan, Maryland Law of Confessions § 8:11 (West 2005) (noting cases, including Smith and
Perdue, that focus more on the coercive nature of the detention than on whether a reasonable
person would feel detained to the level of a formal arrest).
27 See, for example, Beheler, 463 US at 1125; United States v Martin, 95 Fed Appx 169, 177
(6th Cir 2004) (unpublished opinion); United States v Hernandez-Hernandez,327 F3d 703, 706
(8th Cir 2003).
28 See United States v Trueber,238 F3d 79, 93 (1st Cir 2001); Smith, 3 F3d at 1095-96, citing
United States v Serna-Barreto,842 F2d 965, 967 (7th Cir 1988). See also United States v St. Germain, 107 Fed Appx 91, 92 (9th Cir 2004) (unpublished opinion); Martin, 95 Fed Appx at 177;
United States v Galceran,301 F3d 927,929-30 (8th Cir 2002).
See, for example. Galceran,301 F3d at 930; Smith, 3 F3d at 1095-96.
29
Compare United States v Newton, 369 F3d 659,677 (2d Cir 2004) (holding that handcuff30
custody), with Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109-10 (holding that handcuffing and drawing
creates
ing
weapons do not create a custodial arrest).
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determining custody based on the totality of the circumstances." Some
courts have admitted that their own cases are not consistent.32 Often,
courts resist creating a rule to solve the problem. 3 The difficulty courts
have determining custody is further highlighted by the circuit split
over whether Terry stops can rise to the level of Miranda custody. '

B. The Expansion of Terry's Probable Cause Exception
Whereas Miranda was intended to protect individual liberty and
dignity under the Fifth Amendment, Terry balanced Fourth Amendment rights with the needs of police to investigate crime. Terry held

that police may stop and frisk a suspect for weapons without probable
cause, so long as they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed or about to commit a violent crime." The use of the Terry stop

has expanded significantly in the past three decades. Conventional
wisdom holds that violent crime has increased since Terry,6 and that
this increase has given police reason to use more coercive measures in
Terry stops." Although it may not have been appropriate for Officer
31 See, for example, Oregon v Elstad,470 US 298, 309 (1985) ("[Tlhe task of defining 'custody' is a slippery one.").
32
See Cruz v Miller, 255 F3d 77,85 (2d Cir 2001) (internal citations omitted):

We have rejected custody as to a suspect questioned at an airport,.., and as to a suspect
taken out of her apartment during a search and questioned elsewhere in the building ....
We also found no custody as to a person who was told to get out of her car at gunpoint and
then briefly handcuffed ....
However.... we found custody for an airport interrogation
where there were seven officers, a display of handguns, and the removal of the suspect's papers. We also found custody ... as to a suspect taken to a private room at an airport for
questioning. We have recognized that a Terry stop "may turn into custodial detention,"...
but we seem to have placed considerable weight on whether the suspect feels "free to
leave,".., without acknowledging that in all Terry stops (and traffic stops), the suspect does
not feel free to leave, at least not while the permitted (brief) questioning is occurring.
33 See Trueber, 238 F3d at 93 ("There is no scientifically precise formula that enables
courts to distinguish between investigatory stops ... and ... de facto arrests.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
34 See Part I.C.
35 See 392 US at 30.
36
This conventional wisdom seems a bit skewed. Although drug crimes have increased over the
past three decades, serious violent crime has been on the decline. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key
Crime & Justice Facts at a Glance, online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance.htm#Crime
(visited June 7,2006).
37 See, for example, David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect.-The Withering of Terry, 28 UC
Davis L Rev 1,5 (1994):
Perhaps as a result of the high-visibility use of frisks as a contemporary crime control device, or because of general public antipathy to crime, lower courts have stretched the law
governing frisks to the point that the Supreme Court might find it unrecognizable. Lower
courts have consistently expanded the types of offenses always considered violent regardless of the individual circumstances. At the same time, lower courts have also found that
certain types of persons and situations always pose a danger of armed violence to police.
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McFadden to pull a gun on Terry in 1968, today such action may be
deemed appropriate, particularly if the circumstances involve suspicion of a drug crime, burglary, or illegal gambling.3
The expansion of the Terry doctrine has caused as much difficulty
for lower courts as has the contraction and ad hoc nature of the
Miranda doctrine. The limited question in Terry was "whether it is
always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject
him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for
arrest."39 The Court answered no. But, although this was a significant
step in the history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it made some
sense in the context of Terry's facts, at least as compared to the kinds
of police conduct Terry is applied to today.
In Terry, Officer McFadden, a veteran police officer, had been
watching Terry and two other men "casing a job, a stick-up," and he
feared they had a gun.4° When McFadden questioned them about what
they were doing, the men "mumbled something," and McFadden
"grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing
the other two, with Terry between McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of
Terry's overcoat Officer McFadden felt a pistol."'" In this context, the
Court held that
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime."
Terry was about protecting the police officer. It was more about
allowing the limited search for weapons than it was about the limited
seizure of the suspect. But, more important, it was exclusively about
Fourth Amendment concerns, and explicitly not about the Fifth
Amendment concerns addressed in Miranda.'

When confronted with these offenses, persons, or situations, police may automatically frisk,
whether or not any individualized circumstances point to danger.
See id at 24-27 nn 128,132-34,136 (listing categories of cases where frisks have been allowed).
38
39 392 US at 15.
40 Id at 6.
41
42

Idat7.
Id at 27.

43 See id at 19 n 16 ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety
of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'detention' and/or
interrogation.")(emphasis added).
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The Court expanded Terry and, at the same time, narrowed Miranda
in Beheler and Berkemer v McCarty." Beheler, though not a Terry stop
case, focused on when a noncustodial situation becomes custodial and
held that Miranda warnings are not required where a suspect goes
with police to the police station voluntarily, is questioned for less than
thirty minutes, and is then allowed to leave:
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that,
even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement, the questioning took place in a "coercive environment."... The police are required to give Miranda warnings only
"where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom
as to render him in custody."'
The Court emphasized that all suspect-police encounters are coercive,
"simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be
charged with a crime." Thus, the Court expanded what was allowed
under Terry and stepped away from the Fifth Amendment rationale for
Miranda: coercion to self-incrimination is not enough; a suspect must
endure a restriction on his freedom-a Fourth Amendment seizuresimilar to that of a formal arrest before the warnings are required.
The connection between Terry and Miranda became clearer in
Berkemer, which held that the "roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop" does not amount to "custodial interrogation."' Berkemer found that "the usual traffic stop is
more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop,' than to a formal arrest."Y
Berkemer did not hold that all traffic stops are exempt from Miranda;
it held only that "routine" or "usual" traffic stops are exempt. That
makes sense, at least in terms of Beheler's definition of custody: a routine traffic stop does not resemble an arrest, even if it does deprive
freedom of action in a significant way (which, in itself, is debatable).
But Berkemer was a turning point that has led to a significant expansion of the kinds of police conduct allowed under Terry. Some
lower courts have interpreted Berkemer to mean that Miranda warnings are never necessary for a lawful Terry stop.4 ' Berkemer also led
courts to carve out other types of police encounters beyond the rou-

44 468 US 420 (1984).
45 463 US at 1124, quoting Mathiason,429 US at 495. See also Part I.A.1.
46 Beheler,463 US at 1124.
47 468 Us at 435.
48
Id at 439 (internal citation omitted).
49 See, for example, Pelayo-Ruelas,345 F3d at 592.
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tine traffic stop where a stop and frisk is, per se, always allowed. 5Thus
Berkemer provided the impetus for a simultaneous contraction of
Miranda and expansion of Terry. This has led to a circuit split over
whether a Terry stop can rise to the level of Miranda custody. This in-

stability points out the need for a clearer definition of custody in Terry
stop cases, as proposed by this Comment's approach. In addition to
simplifying custody determinations, this Comment's approach emphasizes that it is unconstitutional for a Terry stop to involve conduct that
is custodial under Miranda.

The Circuit Split

C.

The First, Fourth, and Eighth circuits have held that if an investigative stop is reasonable under Terry, then the seized suspect is not in
custody for Miranda purposes." The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth circuits have held that the Terry reasonableness standard is irrelevant to Miranda custody determinations; a stop can be reasonable
under Terry and the suspect can nevertheless be in custody under
Miranda."The distinction matters because if a suspect is in custody, he

must receive Miranda warnings, or else have any incriminating statements excluded from evidence. This Part explains the arguments on
both sides of the split and concludes that both sides are wrong. Part III

proposes this Comment's solution.

See United States v Place, 462 US 696,698 (1983) (holding that, although a ninety-minute
detention was unreasonable, detaining luggage suspected of containing narcotics was generally
reasonable under Terry, without discussion of whether such luggage could pose any danger to
law enforcement); Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109 (allowing a stop and frisk of unarmed suspects on
suspicion of a drug crime). See also Harris, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 5 (cited in note 37) (explaining that lower courts have expanded the types of offenses, persons, and situations deemed always
to pose a danger of armed violence, thus justifying Terry stops for a much broader array of situations "whether or not any individualized circumstances point to danger").
51 See Trueber, 238 F3d at 92; Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1110; Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F3d at 592.
52 See Ali, 68 F3d at 1472, 1473 (holding that whether a stop was permissible under Terry is
irrelevant to the Mirandaquestion, because "Terry is an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable-cause requirement, not to the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination");
Smith, 3 F3d at 1097 (noting the "'vast difference' between Mirandarights aimed at "'protectling]
a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment"'), quoting Schneckloth
v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 241 (1973); Kim, 292 F3d at 976 ("[W]hether an individual detained
during the execution of a search warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues"); United States v Perdue, 8 F3d 1455, 1464-65 (10th Cir 1993) (holding that a gunpoint stop
that was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment nevertheless placed the suspect in custody for
purposes of Miranda).
50

2006]

Drawing a Line between Terry and Miranda

1085

1. If it is reasonable, it is not custody.
The First, Fourth, and Eighth circuits have held explicitly that
Terry and Miranda do not overlap: reasonable Terry stops are by definition noncustodial. These circuits allow Terry stops to become coer-

cive without requiring Miranda warnings. The Fourth Circuit offers
the clearest example. United States v Leshuk53 found the suspect's rea-

sonable belief that he was in custody insufficient to transform a Terry
stop into Miranda custody." Leshuk eschewed the free-to-leave cus-

tody test and held that, because the stop was reasonable, it did not
constitute Miranda custody: "A brief but complete restriction of lib-

erty is valid under Terry."" Furthermore, "[i]nstead of being distinguished by the absence of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ
from custodial interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion."" The court focused
on the duration of detention, to the exclusion of the degree of restraint. Indeed: "[W]e have concluded that drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or
using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful
stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes."'7 The court left
open the possibility that something might "elevate a lawful stop into a
custodial arrest," but it is hard to imagine what.
The First and Eighth circuits also have held that reasonable Terry

stops are not custodial. The Eighth Circuit relied heavily on dicta in
Berkemer to find that Miranda warnings were not required. "Citing
Berkemer, we have declared that, 'No Miranda warning is necessary

for persons detained for a Terry stop."' The First Circuit also empha65 F3d 1105 (4th Cir 1995).
Id at 1109.
55
Id, quoting United States v Moore, 817 F2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir 1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56
Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109, citing Floridav Royer, 460 US 491,500 (1983).
57 Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109-10.
58
Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F3d at 592. The court also quotes the following two passages from
Berkemer
53

54.

The comparatively nonthreatening character of [typical Terry stops] explains the absence of
any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda.The
similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purpose of Miranda.
468 US at 440 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the second passage PelayoRuelas quoted from Berkemer cuts back on its finding that Terry stops never require Miranda
warnings. "If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected
to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Berkemer,468 US at 440. In this second passage,
Berkemer explicitly states that a traffic stop may become custodial, in which case Mirandawarnings would be required and the stop would no longer be valid under Terry.

1086

The University of Chicago Law Review

[73:1075

sized Berkemer:9 "Terry stops, though inherently somewhat coercive,
do not usually involve the type of police dominated or compelling
atmosphere which necessitates Miranda warnings."' The court acknowledged in United States v Trueber6 that a Terry stop could escalate to a de facto arrest, in which case it would no longer be a valid
Terry stop and would require Miranda warnings. But Trueber ignored
the expansion of Terry stops into what would otherwise be considered
custodial situations: the court concluded that Trueber was not in custody, not because the force used did not rise to the level of a formal
arrest, but because such force was reasonable given that Trueber was
suspected of drug trafficking, a commonly violent crime. 3 Trueber allowed its Terry analysis to make its Mirandacustody determination.
Finally, the Second Circuit is conflicted over whether Terry stops
can rise to the level of Miranda custody. In Cruz v Miller,4 the Second Circuit concluded that a suspect was not in custody, even though
several factors pointed in that direction.6 The court weighed the procustody factors against the noncustody factors, and in the end gave up
the pursuit:
The difficulty of determining "custody" for purposes of Miranda,
...
and the Supreme Court's lack of clear guidance on the issue in
the context of sidewalk questioning suggest that, unless the facts
clearly establish custody, a state court should be deemed to have
made a reasonable application of clearly established Supreme
Court law in concluding that custody for Miranda purposes was
not shown. 7
Courts holding that a reasonable detention is necessarily noncustodial do not focus on the coercive nature of police behavior during
such detentions. Instead of acknowledging the Fifth Amendment concerns inherent in such stops, they focus on whether danger to the police officer justified the coercive conduct. If it does, they conclude that
the stop was reasonable and therefore noncustodial. But such stops
59 See Trueber,238 F3d at 92.
60
Id, quoting United States v Streifel, 781 F2d 953, 958 (1st Cir 1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
238 F3d 79 (1st Cir 2001).
61
62
See id at 92.
63
See id at 94.
64 Compare Cruz, 255 F3d at 86 (analyzing federal law to determine whether a state court
reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and finding that the state court's conclusion of
reasonableness should be followed unless custody is clearly shown), with Ali, 68 F3d at 1472
(holding that reasonableness under Terry is inapposite to Mirandacustody).
65
255 F3d 77 (2d Cir 2001).
See id at 94.
66
67
Id at 85-86.
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are often custodial in the sense meant by Miranda,Beheler, and Berkemer-they compel suspects to speak-and should therefore require a
reading of the Mirandawarnings.
2. Reasonableness is irrelevant to custody.
The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits have held that a
suspect may be in custody for Miranda purposes, even if the coercive
conduct is reasonable given the circumstances of the stop.6 The Ninth
Circuit, in United States v Kim," found that "whether an individual
detained during the execution of a search warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes are two different issues.'70
Police kept Insook Kim locked in her store for three hours.7" The court
considered that factor and several others (Kim did not speak English
well, police outnumbered her five to one and surrounded her in an intimidating way even if they did not handcuff her, and they would not let
her talk to her husband or son') in concluding that, even if the detention was reasonable because Kim was suspected of selling ingredients
for methamphetamine, it nonetheless constituted custody for Miranda
purposes.
The Second Circuit, in United States v Ali, ' also held that whether
a stop is reasonable under Terry is irrelevant to the Miranda question,
because "Terry is an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable
cause requirement, not to the Fifth Amendment protections against7
self-incrimination." 5 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v Smith, '
agreed that "our inquiry into the circumstances of temporary detention for a Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda analysis requires a
different focus than that for a Fourth Amendment Terry stop."r Smith
noted the "vast difference" between Miranda rights aimed at "protect[ing] a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the
68

See Ali, 68 F3d at 1472-73; Smith, 3 F3d at 1097; Kim, 292 F3d at 976; Perdue, 8 F3d at

1464-65.
292 F3d 969 (9th Cir 2002).
Id at 976.
71 See id at 971.
72
See id at 971-73.
73 See id at 977.
74
68 F3d 1468 (2d Cir 1995).
75
Id at 1473 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The fact that the seizure and search of a
suspect comports with the Fourth Amendment under Terry simply does not determine whether
the suspect's contemporaneous oral admissions may be used against him or her at trial. A Terry
stop may turn into custodial detention." Id, citing United States v Hooper, 935 F2d 484, 494 (2d
Cir 1991).
76
3 F3d 1088 (7th Cir 1993).
77 Id at 1096.
69

70
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Fourth Amendment."78 Finally, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v
Perdue,9 held that a gunpoint stop that was reasonable nevertheless
placed the suspect in custody for purposes of Miranda.
Many of these courts are also wrong. By allowing a Terry stop to
rise to the level of Miranda custody while remaining a valid Terry stop
these courts implicitly endorse the expansion of Terry to cover custodial situations. That endorsement allows police to take suspects into
custody without probable cause, so long as they read them their
rights." This violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures.n A constitutional approach would be to require
the Miranda warnings in such situations, but also to emphasize that
when a Terry stop becomes custodial, it is no longer a valid Terry stop,
and probable cause is required. This Comment's proposal-requiring
a focus on degree and duration of restraint- highlights that such an
approach is compelled by the Constitution.

II. A NEW RULE FOR DETERMINING CUSTODY
The case law on the custody test tries to pinpoint the difference
between a Terry stop and Mirandacustody, but there is no single characteristic that, if present, makes a Terry stop custodial. " Courts therefore have settled for vague totality of the circumstances analyses. This
Comment's approach instead recommends considering only the degree and duration of the restraint. Part II.A describes this approach.
Part II.B offers the Supreme Court's de facto arrest cases as support
for the approach. Part II.C analyzes existing cases under the approach.

Id at 1097, quoting Bustamonte,412 US at 240-41.
8 F3d 1455 (10th Cir 1993).
80
Id at 1464-65.
81 But see United States v Hooper, 935 F2d at 494 ("If the intrusion becomes excessive, it
ceases to be a Terry type detention that can be justified based on reasonable suspicion and instead becomes a seizure that requires a showing of probable cause.") See also Note, Custodial
78

79

Engineering: Cleaning up the Scope of Miranda Custody During Coercive Terry Stops, 108 Harv

L Rev 665, 671 n 49 (1995) ("Because a Terry inquiry is based only on reasonable suspicion, the
inquiry cannot become a custodial interrogation without the stop becoming an illegal arrest.").
82
See Terry, 392 US at 26-27 (noting that "taking a person into custody" requires probable
cause). See also Beheler, 463 US at 1125 (finding that custody consists of "a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest"); Dunaway v
New York, 442 US 200,208-09 (1979) (discussing the probable cause requirement for "the kind
of intrusion involved in an arrest" and explaining that the kind of intrusion involved in a Terry
stop-and-frisk is "a sui generis rubric of police conduct" involving less than probable cause)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
83
See Smith, 3 F3d at 1095-96 (noting that none of the factors considered in a totality of
the circumstances analysis is dispositive).
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A. Balancing the Duration and Degree of Restraint
The proposed approach balances the duration and the degree of
restraint in making custody determinations. It is not a bright line rule,
and it is not absolute. It is a balancing test that weighs two inversely
related factors to provide courts an intelligible principle to guide custody determinations. This approach can be distinguished from a bright
line rule in the same way "reasonable doubt" is distinguished from a
mathematical percentage of certainty in jury instructions. Just as
judges never tell jurors that a finding of reasonable doubt means that
they are less than 97 percent certain, this Comment is not meant to
give judges a tool" to determine with any mathematical certainty
where an investigative stop ends and custody begins. Instead, this approach is meant to highlight the relationship between the two most
important factors in a custody/Terry stop case.
Under this approach, the degree and duration of restraint are inversely related. Many lower court cases fit the rule: they find custody
where the degree of restraint is low, but the duration is long; they also
find custody where the duration is brief, but the degree of restraint is
high. Following this approach should lead to results that are fairer,
more uniform and predictable, and more in line with Supreme Court
precedent. The approach simply presents the facts of cases in relation to
one another. The approach makes it easier to compare a new case to
precedent, and it prevents the ad hoc nature of the common custody
tests.
The goal is to address the hard case: a stop that is reasonable
given the circumstances, but also coercive." An approach that adequately addresses the hard cases will force courts to acknowledge that
if a stop puts the suspect on the custody side of the line, then the stop
is not valid under Terry. Probable cause is required. So are Miranda
warnings.

84

85

See Figure 1.
See Part I.C for discussion of the circuit split over these hard cases.
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FIGURE 1
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1. Duration.
Time is a discrete, quantifiable factor, and courts have understandably focused on it in Terry stop cases. Still, there is no consensus
on how long a detention has to be before it becomes custodial, or
when the clock starts and stops. This Comment compares detentions
based on when the police officer first interacts with the suspect face to
face (as opposed to when the officer turns on his flashers to pull the
suspect over, for instance), but this is not crucial. What is crucial is that
the clock be started and stopped at the same point in each case, so that
cases can be compared. Courts are not consistent on this point. The
only explicit consensus is that Terry stops must be "brief '' "The Supreme Court has held a ninety-minute detention unreasonable." However, the Court stated that no rigid time limitation on Terry stops is
See Appendix for a listing of cases plotted on Figure 1.
Berkemer, 468 Us at 441-42 ("[Olnly a short period of time elapsed between the stop
and the arrest. At no point during that interval was respondent informed that his detention
would not be temporary.... Treatment of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest."); United States v Robinson, 414 US 218, 228 (1973), quoting
Terry, 392 US at 26 ("The protective search for weapons... constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person."); Leshuk, 65 FBd at 1109 ("A brief but
complete restriction of liberty is valid under Terry."); In re M.E.B., 638 A2d 1123, 1126 (DC App
1993) ("A Terry seizure ...
involves a more temporary detention, designed to last only until a preliminary investigation either generates probable cause or results in the release of the suspect.").
88
See United States v Place,462 US 696,709-10 (1983).
86
87
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possible or desirable. "' This flexibility has allowed lower courts to uphold a ninety-minute detention as reasonable under Terry,1 while
other courts have found Miranda custody where a detention lasted

only fifteen minutes," roughly five minutes,9 and even less than one
minute. 9 Courts also have found detentions of thirty minutes94 and
approximately ten minutes9 noncustodial.
9
Courts, therefore, clearly do not focus exclusively on duration.

6

Something else is at work. Cases holding that reasonable Terry stops
do not require Miranda warnings rely most often on Berkemer, without considering that the "routine traffic stop" in Berkemer lasted only

about five to ten minutes, making it one of the shortest detentions
discussed here. That is a far cry from the ninety-minute detention
found to be noncustodial in Trueber.

Time is not doing all of the work in these cases, but the fact that
most cases do emphasize the length of the detention suggests that it is
an important factor.
2. Degree of restraint.
To "restrain" means to "check, hold back, or prevent (a person or
thing) from some course of action."' This Comment interprets "restraint" as bodily restraint-conduct that physically prevents a suspect
from leaving the scene-because that interpretation best comports
with the cases. In terms of restraint, the distinction between a Terry
stop and Miranda custody is primarily a physical one: did the police
officer merely pat down the suspect, or did he grab him and hold him

89 See id at 709 n 10.
90 See Trueber, 238 F3d at 92. However, Trueber relied on Berkemer (which involved a
much briefer-probably less than ten minutes-stop) in holding that such a detention was reasonable and therefore noncustodial, suggesting that the Trueber court was not focused on the
length of the detention involved. In fact, the court in Trueber never stated explicitly how long the
detention lasted; the reader must assess the facts and reach that conclusion independently. Trueber was stopped and questioned for ten to fifteen minutes, and then questioned for an additional
hour and twenty minutes in his hotel room. See id at 84-85.
91 See Ali,68 F3d at 1471-73; Smith, 3 F3d at 1093,1098.
92 See Perdue, 8 F3d at 1458-59, 1467 (describing the stop-which included forcing the
defendant out of his car and onto the ground and questioning him at gunpoint-and the "rapidity with which the events unfolded").
93 See United States v Newton, 369 F3d 659,664,677 (2d Cir 2004).
94 See United States v Pelayo-Ruelas,345 F3d 589,591 (8th Cir 2003).
95 See Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1107, 1110 (describing a detention that seems to be roughly ten
minutes long without stating how long it lasted).
96 See, for example, id at 1109-10 (focusing on the length of detention without explicitly
stating the length of detention or how long would be too long).
97 Oxford English Dictionary756 (Clarendon 2d ed 1989).
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down? Was the subject free to leave, or was he restrained to the degree of arrest, such that he would not be allowed to leave?"
Furthermore, the other factors courts consider in custody determinations-those that this Comment's approach ignores, including
location, language, and the extent to which the suspect is presented
with evidence of his own guilt -appear to be attempts to ascertain the
level of physical restraint applied to the suspect. On their own, these
factors say nothing about the coercive nature of the encounter; it is
only their capacity to physically restrain the suspect that makes these
factors relevant to courts. For example, the location of the encounter is
often a factor that courts consider in making custody determinations.
But location is not relevant per se - encounters at police stations are
not always custodial, and street encounters are not always noncustodial. Location makes a difference when it physically restrains or confines the suspect.9 Otherwise, location is immaterial.
Therefore, "restraint" under this Comment's approach does not
include the location of the encounter, other than aspects of that location that physically restrain the suspect, such as that it is a locked room.
For the same reason, it does not consider language used by police.
Another reason for not considering factors such as the language
used by the officers, the extent to which the suspect is confronted with
his guilt, and the subjective impressions of the officer or the suspect is
that these factors require interpretation of the officers and/or the suspect's subjective impressions, which the Supreme Court has forbidden.' The language used and the location of the encounter can be
determined objectively, but their impact on whether the detention was
custodial is often subjective. Courts often discuss whether the location
was "neutral" or "familiar" to the suspect, on the theory that such locations are somehow less coercive. '°' This implicitly looks to the suspect's subjective impressions. Moreover, a court may misinterpret
those impressions: an investigative detention in familiar territory
98
See Berkemer, 468 US at 442 ("[A] single police officer asked respondent a modest
number of questions and requested him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible
to passing motorists. Treatment of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional
equivalent of formal arrest.").
99 Compare, for example, Beheler, 463 US at 1125 (holding that a suspect is not in custody
when he voluntarily accompanies police to a police station), with Kim, 292 F3d at 971 (holding
that a suspect was in custody where she was locked in her own store and not allowed to leave).
See also United States v Martin, 95 Fed Appx 169, 177 (6th Cir 2004) (unpublished opinion) (discussing the significance of the location of the stop in terms of whether it "confined" the suspect).
100 See Stansbury v California,511 US 318, 323 (1994) (finding that the officer's subjective
view of whether the person interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining custody under
Miranda).
101 See, for example, Kim, 292 F3d at 977 (discussing the effects of interrogating the suspect
at her own place of business).
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might be all the more coercive-it might be more frightening to be
interrogated in your home or hotel room than at a police station because of the intrusion on private space.' It is hard to determine in the
abstract what the location adds to the analysis.
Language may also be ambiguous. Short of saying "You are under
arrest," much of what an officer says to a suspect could have multiple
meanings, some implying restraint and some not. Still, leaving out language is controversial. It allows an officer to say to a suspect, "If you
know what's good for you, you'll tell me everything I want to know."
This threat would not qualify as "restraint" under this Comment's
definition, which may be a substantial criticism. It is unlikely, however,
that the Supreme Court would conclude that such words create custodial situations either. These words do not appear to restrain to the
degree of a formal arrest, as required by Beheler. In the framework of
this Comment, the degree of restraint implicit in such language does
not constitute custody.
Another reason to ignore the other factors commonly used is that
they complicate the analysis, and, inasmuch as duration and degree of
restraint are doing most of the work in these cases, it is unnecessary at
best (and obfuscating at worse) to include them.
Finally, this Comment's understanding of "restraint" draws on interpretations of the Fifth Amendment arguing that the amendment
sets up its own hierarchy of physical restraint allowed by the government. The text of the Fifth Amendment suggests a range of permissible restraint from capital punishment (taking life) at the upper end to
issuing a fine (taking property) at the lower end.' m
Figure 1 lays out this Comment's hierarchy of restraint, which
covers a narrow range of police encounters common to Terry stops. At
the low end of the degree of restraint axis is "Multiple agents." Multiple officers imply physical force in a way that a single agent would not.
Indeed, "Single agent" is not on Figure 1, because situations involving
102 See, for example, Payton v New York, 445 US 573, 587 (1980) ("Freedom from intrusion
into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth
Amendment.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 See David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice
and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 Notre Dame L Rev 717, 722-23 (1999) (internal
citations omitted):

The Fifth Amendment ... regulates the way in which the government applies its power to
the individual. The clauses proceed in descending order of gravity for the individual affected by the government action-from a requirement for how the government may prosecute felonies (i.e., very serious crimes) to a purely civil matter, the taking of property. The
Fifth Amendment thus sets forth, if only in broad outline, a hierarchy of restraints on how
the power of the state is exercised, from irremediable capital punishment to the exercise of
imminent domain [sic], easily to be remedied by a money payment.
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just one officer, and no other form of physical restraint, would be like
Terry or Berkemer- sidewalk or roadside stops in which there was no
custody finding. When multiple agents are involved in a stop, it is because of the possibility that the suspect will need to be restrained.'14 By

contrast, during an ordinary traffic stop, say for speeding, a reasonable
person would not feel free to leave, but she wouldn't feel as if she was
under arrest, either.'0 5
At the high end of the degree of restraint axis is "Gunpoint."
Like the presence of multiple officers, the tactic of holding suspects at
gunpoint is used because of the possible need for physical restraint.
Moreover, even though mere brandishing of a weapon does not physically "restrain" (like handcuffs or a locked room does), the threat of
being shot might as well be physically restraining because of the fear it
causes6 This is a threat of extreme violence, to be carried out if the
suspect does not do as the officer commands. This kind of coercion
says, "Tell me what I want to know, or I'll shoot you." This is well beyond the kind of coercion Miranda custody was designed to prevent.

Miranda set the bar at coercion likely to make a person incriminate
himself. This included, for example, subtle techniques such as "goodcop, bad-cop" interrogation that involved officers manipulating suspects into confessing, and fell far short of threats to shoot suspects.
Still, it is important to note that, technically speaking, being held at
gunpoint is just a proxy for physical restraint. The use of proxies for
physical restraint on this axis reveals that the definition of "restraint"
is rough around the edges."
104 Compare United States v Acosta, 363 F3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir 2004) ("The fact that the
detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen further mutes his
sense of vulnerability."), quoting Berkemer, 468 US at 438-39.
105 See Berkemer, 468 US at 437:
A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he
will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the
officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in
the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.
Berkemer notes that "no State requires that a detained motorist be arrested unless he is accused
of a specified serious crime, refuses to promise to appear in court, or demands to be taken before
a magistrate." Id at 437 n 26.
106 A suspect who is actually shot, as opposed to merely being threatened, likely has a more
serious substantive due process claim than a Mirandaviolation claim, and therefore such a situation is not considered in this Comment. Consider generally Chavez v Martinez, 538 US 760
(2003) (holding that a suspect who was coercively interrogated after being shot did not have a
claim for a Miranda violation but that a substantive due process claim should be considered on
remand).
107 The definition of "force" faces similar ambiguities in the rape context. Catharine MacKinnon
has argued that all sex that is not mutual should be considered rape, and the Akayesu tribunal defines
rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are

coercive. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a FeministTheory of the State 172-73 (Harvard 1989);
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In the middle of the axis are "Handcuffs" and "Locked in a
room." Reasonable minds may differ about which of these involves
more restraint (and about where other forms of restraint should fall
on the axis). Indeed, lower courts have differed on these points.', This
Comment suggests that being locked in a room is more restraining,
because, theoretically, a suspect could run away with handcuffs on.
Not so when he is locked in a room. The latter is more like jail; the
former is more like Officer McFadden's restraint of Terry. The psychological affront of being grabbed and handcuffed is not as coercive as
being locked up. Under this view, being locked up is more likely to
induce a suspect to incriminate himself because it involves a greater
degree of restraint. However, this conclusion may depend on an intuition that being locked up generally lasts longer than being handcuffed.
In addition to being a potentially false assumption, this gets away
from the degree of restraint axis and back to the duration axis. It is
plausible that, if duration is held constant, a reasonable person would
find being handcuffed more coercive than being locked in a room, if
only because handcuffs are so physically uncomfortable.
The cases don't help this determination. They don't support or
undercut the contention that being locked in a room is more coercive
than being handcuffed. The cases don't agree that being handcuffed or
locked in a room (or held at gunpoint, for that matter) is coercive at
all. Furthermore, courts confront factual situations involving myriad
variations of restraint. A suspect may be handcuffed and placed in an
unlocked room, or handcuffed and held at gunpoint, or held at gunpoint by multiple officers. This Comment does not attempt to address
these admittedly difficult situations. Instead, it lays out a hierarchy of
restraint based on the level of physical control the government has
over the suspect, and includes in that hierarchy categories of conduct
common to Terry stops.
B.

De Facto Arrest

The Supreme Court's de facto arrest cases address when an investigative stop becomes a "de facto arrest." They acknowledge that, even
if the police officer does not formally arrest the suspect, the officer's
conduct, if it is sufficiently restraining, may transform a Terry stop into
Rwanda InternationalCriminalTribunalPronounces Guilty Verdict in Historic GenocideTrial, UN Doc
Press Release AFR/94 IJ2895 (Sept 2, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/
1998/19980902.afr94.html (visited June 7,2006). But both of these definitions beg the questions: What
is "mutual"? What is "coercive"?
108 Compare Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109 (finding that handcuffs are not a sufficient restraint to
create custody), with Newton, 369 F3d at 676 (finding that "[hlandcuffs are generally recognized
as a hallmark of a formal arrest").
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a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.'. These cases do not address Miranda custody-their focus is whether there was a Fourth
Amendment violation, not whether that violation compelled the suspect to self-incriminate-but the factual determination is the same,
and therefore they provide guidance for custody determinations and
support this Comment's approach.
The de facto arrest cases identify a list of factors for determining
when a Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest. These factors mirror
those used by lower courts in making custody determinations, but they
also provide support for the rule proposed here because they tend to
focus on the degree and duration of restraint at issue. For example,
where suspects are taken involuntarily to a police station,"O or to a
private, locked room,"' the Court focuses on those restraints and not
on the length of detention; the suggestion is that the length of detention could be very brief, and the situation would still be deemed custodial because of the degree of restraint used."2 On the other hand,
where the degree of restraint is relatively minimal, the situation often
is not deemed custodial unless the Court determines that the detention has gone on too long."3
In Dunaway v New York,"' the Court found that the defendant
had been subject to a de facto arrest because he was taken from a private dwelling, transported unwillingly to the police station, and subjected to custodial interrogation resulting in a confession-all based
on reasonable suspicion, not probable cause."' The Court held that this
exceeded the limits of Terry. The court focused on the fact that the
suspect was taken unwillingly to the police station. This emphasis on
location was more about physical restraint or control over the suspect
109 It bears considering that not all de facto arrests are deemed custodial, and not all custodial arrests involve interrogation. See generally, for example, Wayne A. Logan, An Exception
Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 Yale L & Pol Rev 381 (2001)
(discussing the difficulty in determining when an arrest has occurred justifying a search incident
to arrest).
110 See Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200,216 (1979).
111 See Florida v Royer,460 US 491,502-03 (1983).
112 Compare Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1109-10:
A brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid under Terry.... Instead of being distinguished by the absence of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ from custodial interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion.... From these standards, we have concluded that drawing weapons, handcuffing a
suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threatening to use force
does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Mirandapurposes.
113 See Place, 462 US at 709-10 (finding a ninety-minute detention of luggage unreasonable
though no restraint of the person appeared to be involved).
114 442 US 200 (1979).
115 See United States v Sharpe, 470 US 675,684 n 4 (1985) (construing the facts of Dunaway).
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than it was about location per se. Likewise, in Florida v Royer," 6 the
Court held that a defendant detained for fifteen minutes in a small
room at an airport, while police searched his luggage for narcotics, was
under de facto arrest."7 Royer emphasized that investigative stops
must be brief, but given that this stop was brief, it seems that the degree of restraint involved was significant to the Court.
At the other end of this spectrum, in United States v Place"8 the
Court held that ninety minutes was too long for a Terry stop."9 Place
involved a seizure of luggage, but the Court treated it as a seizure of
the suspect who owned the luggage.' The Court held that an investigative seizure of personal property could be justified under Terry in
the right circumstances, but that "[t]he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure
was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.' '2 ' There was no corresponding discussion of the degree of restraint used. This conclusion,
was too lengthy, so
too, supports the proposed approach: the detention
'2
used.
was
restraint
little
that
matter
not
it did
Finally, in United States v Sharpe,' the Court attempted to tie the
earlier de facto arrest cases together, but determined that creating a
workable rule to apply in later cases was probably not possible.' Inasmuch as Sharpe warned against fashioning such a rule, it could be said
to cut against this Comment's proposed approach. But, like this Comment, Sharpe did focus on two factors, one of which is shared by this
Comment's approach. Sharpe focused on the length of detention, and,
like Terry, on the balance between law enforcement needs and the
suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.'2 Thus, Sharpe lends support to
the Comment's approach as well.

116

460 US 491 (1983).

Id at 503. See also id at 500 (noting that "an investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop").
118 462 US 696 (1983).
117

121

at 709.
Id at 709-10.
Id at 709.

122

However, in a later case, the Court emphasized that:

119 Id
120

[T]he rationale underlying [the conclusion in Place] was premised on the fact that the police knew of respondent's arrival time for several hours beforehand, and the Court assumed
that the police could have arranged for a trained narcotics dog in advance and thus avoided
the necessity of holding respondent's luggage for 90 minutes.
Sharpe, 470 US at 684-85.
123 470 US 675 (1985) (finding that a twenty-minute detention was reasonable because it was a
diligent investigation by a Drug Enforcement Administration agent with no unnecessary delay).
124

See id at 685.

125 See id, quoting Place, 462 US at 709:
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Applying the Rule to Existing Cases
This Part applies the proposed approach to four lower-court

cases, and argues that some are incorrectly decided because they did
not focus on the inverse relationship between the degree and duration
of restraint. Under this Comment's proposal, cases holding that reasonableness under Terry means no custody under Miranda are more
likely to be wrongly decided. This is because courts on that side of the
circuit split are less likely to consider the coerciveness of the facts in
question once they determine that the stop was reasonable." 6 However, certain courts on the other side of the split -those holding that a
stop may be custodial under Miranda and still be valid under Terry-

are wrong under this Comment's approach, too. This is because these
courts allow police to take suspects into custody on less than probable
cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. All of these courts fail
to consider the most relevant factors-degree and duration of restraint- closely.

Though it is a close case, the Second Circuit should not have found
custody in United States v Newton,"' even though Newton was handcuffed and detained by multiple officers, because his detention was so

brief-less than one minute."' Had he been detained twenty minutes
longer, the number of officers and the handcuffs clearly would have
made this detention custodial; had the officers drawn their guns or

physically restrained him, the brief duration would not have kept this
detention from being custodial. But on its facts, the case does not involve a sufficient degree or duration of restraint to constitute custody.12
While it is clear that "the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as
to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion," we have emphasized the need to consider the law
enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes.
126 See Pelayo-Ruelas,345 F3d at 592; Trueber, 238 F3d at 92; Leshuk, 65 F3d at 1110.
127 369 F3d 659 (2d Cir 2004).
128

Id at 664.

As for the other cases on this side of the circuit split, Kim correctly found custody where
the defendant was locked in her place of employment (separated from her husband and son) and
questioned by several police officers, for a total of three hours. 292 F3d at 976. Ali correctly
remanded for reconsideration a finding of noncustody where the defendant had his ticket,
boarding pass, and passport taken away, was pulled aside into an adjacent corridor or jetway at
an airport, and was questioned by seven customs officials with five weapons showing, for fifteen
minutes. 68 F3d at 1472. Smith incorrectly found a reasonable Terry stop but correctly found
custody where the suspects were handcuffed, and the "officers outnumbered the [five] suspects,"
who were questioned for fifteen to twenty minutes. Smith, 3 F3d at 1092. A police encounter
cannot constitutionally be both custodial under Miranda and reasonable under Terry. See text
accompanying notes 11 and 82. Perdue also found custody for a reasonable Terry stop where two
officers pulled over two suspects and held them at gunpoint on the ground while police helicopters circled overhead, throughout questioning for five minutes. Perdue, 8 F3d at 1464-65. Again,
129
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By contrast, United States v Pelayo-Ruelas"4 was rightly decided,
even though it was wrongly analyzed. The facts clearly point to noncustody, though not merely because they were reasonable under Terry.
Multiple officers asked the suspect to leave his vehicle, conducted a
pat-down search for weapons, and questioned him for thirty minutes."'
During this time, an agent got written consent to search the car and
had a drug dog brought in, but used no other restraints. The degree
and duration of restraint put this case in the noncustody zone.", The
court should have analyzed the case for degree and duration of restraint, and not simply concluded that, because the police conduct was
reasonable, the stop was noncustodial.
Trueber involved a much higher degree of restraint over a longer
period of time than did Pelayo-Ruelas. At least two agents and two
police officers pulled Trueber over after receiving a tip that he possessed cocaine; one officer had his gun drawn as he approached the
car. The detention lasted a total of ninety minutes, and included both a
traffic stop and a search of Trueber's hotel room. All told, five law enforcement officers were involved. The district court found that, because there was probable cause to arrest Trueber from the moment
police pulled him over and because they intended to arrest him, he
deserved Miranda warnings." But the appeals court disagreed,'" finding reasonable suspicion to justify pulling over the truck, and that the
limited detention and search did not escalate beyond its original justification, so that it did not warrant Miranda warnings.'5 The court focused on its perception of the reasonableness of the detention, and
not on whether the detention was custodial. The length of the detention and the amount of force used put this case well into the custody
zone under this Comment's proposed approach.
Finally, Leshuk also was wrongly decided; the court should have
determined that the stop was custodial. The defendants were stopped
in the woods one mile off the road by two officers and an armed turkey hunter."6 The hunter threatened to shoot their dog.3 ' The officers
while this encounter was unquestionably custodial, it should not have been deemed reasonable
under Terry. Custody requires probable cause.
130 345 F3d 589 (8th Cir 2003) (finding that a suspect is not in custody when an investigative
stop is reasonable).
131

132

Id at 591.
See id at 593.

See Trueber, 238 F3d at 92.
See id ("The subjective intent of the agents is not relevant to either part of the inquiry: it
does not impact the validity of the initial investigative stop, and it has no bearing on determining
whether police conduct transformed an investigative stop into a de facto arrest.").
133

134

135

See id at 93,95.

136

See Leshuk,65 F3d at 1107.

137

See id.
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did not read them their rights until they had walked back to the road,
one of the defendants had tried to run, and an officer caught him."'
The court did not say, but a conservative estimate would put the detention at twenty to thirty minutes. This adds up to custody because of
the duration, the number of detainers, and the prominent presence of
the gun (the threat to shoot the dog is perhaps a plus factor). Furthermore, the location in this encounter possibly may be considered a
form of physical restraint because there was no place for the suspects
to go. In that respect, location in this case is somewhat like a locked
room. But this argument stretches this Comment's proposed approach
a bit. It is enough to say that the degree and duration of restraint,
without consideration of location, made the encounter custodial, but
the court held otherwise. 9
III. CRITIQUE

Criticism of the proposed approach likely will focus on the legitimacy of the degree of restraint factor, and it may take two tacks:
first, that it is an arbitrary bright line rule, and second, that the points
may be manipulated to achieve desired outcomes. Parts III.A and
III.B address these criticisms in turn.
A. The Danger and Appeal of a Bright Line Rule
This Comment's approach attempts to achieve some of the benefits of a bright line rule (primarily increased predictability and decreased cost of decision) without the attendant costs (arbitrariness or
over- and underinclusiveness). It attempts to establish an intelligible
principle that courts can follow (and that people can use to plan their
behavior), without leading to arbitrary results.
A true bright line rule in this area of law would be devastating to
many criminal defendants. Bright line rules are characteristically both
over- and underinclusive. That means the rate of error is higher than
with an individualized determination. The cost of that error is large
(freedom is at stake), so we want judges to be able to make case-bycase determinations, and that requires discretion. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has resisted creating a bright line rule for determining whether
a Terry stop is reasonable because "common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.' "
138
139
140

See id.
See id at 1110.
Sharpe,470 US at 685:

Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place,considered together, may in some instances
create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto
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But this Comment's approach is not a bright line rule. If bright
line rules are on one side of a pendulum's swing, then courts, in eschewing such rules in custody cases, have swung too far the other way.
What courts have now is a standardless standard. This Comment's
proposal attempts to bring courts back to the middle, to an intelligible
principle to guide decisionmaking without leading to arbitrary results.
In that vein, the proposal instructs courts to focus on the inverse relationship between the degree and duration of restraint. But it sets no
time limits and it proscribes no conduct as per se custodial. It merely
ties the two factors together and argues that consideration of their
inverse relationship will lead to more predictable, uniform results.
A potential further attack is that this retreat from a bright line
rule merely puts us back at square one, with the totality of the circumstances test courts currently use. This is a slippery slope argument: if
this Comment's approach doesn't actually bar consideration of more
than just the two primary factors, then what is to prevent consideration of more than the two primary factors? What is to prevent consideration of every conceivable factor? But the slope need not slip. It is
possible to focus on the degree and duration of restraint exclusively.
More important, it is not disastrous to this approach if the slope does
slip a little. In other words, progress has still been made if a court balances the degree and duration of restraint, and then adds another factor to the balance-the presence of a police dog, for instance, or the
presence of multiple kinds of restraint. This still counts as progress
because, before this Comment's approach, courts were not operating
within any guiding framework, much less explicitly focusing on the
inverse relationship between degree and duration of restraint. Once
they start doing that, secondary consideration of other factors does
not return them to the standardless test they formerly used.

arrest. Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no
longer be justified as an investigative stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on
Terry stops... Much as a "bright line" rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must
govern over rigid criteria.
See also Richard A. Williamson, The Virtue (and Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth Amendment and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U Ill L Rev 1, 386 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted):
[C]ourts must recognize that the Fourth Amendment's command that seizures of people be
reasonable cannot be implemented fully simply by use of a clock and a yardstick. Qualitative as well as quantitative interests define the nature of our right to be free of unreasonable seizures. The reasonableness of a seizure depends on not only when [it] is made but
also how it is carried out. Thus, in categorizing a seizure, courts must consider the amount of
force applied or threatened.
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Another aspect of this criticism is that it is arbitrary to focus only
on these two factors. But these are the factors that matter most."'
Language may seem equally important. Certain threats ("I'm going to
shoot you if you don't talk") may be almost as coercive as being held
at gunpoint. Location may also seem equally important. But location
and language are not relevant per se. They are only relevant inasmuch
as they approximate physical restraint. Furthermore, consideration of
these factors beyond their capacity to physically restrain entails consideration of subjective impressions, which the Supreme Court forbids
in this context. And it complicates when one goal of this Comment's
approach is to simplify. Consideration of more than two factors would
keep courts in the totality of the circumstances morass where they currently find themselves. Why not simplify further, and apply just one factor? There is no single characteristic that, if present, makes a Terry stop
custodial. ' The inversely related factors of degree and duration of restraint balance these two extremes.
B.

Susceptible to Manipulation

Perhaps, though, far from being too rigid, this rule is actually just
as vague and ad hoc as the totality of the circumstances analysis courts
already apply. This would be the case if it simply grouped every factor
but "duration" under "degree." To avoid this problem, the approach
disciplines consideration of the degree of restraint. It focuses only on
physical restraints of the suspect, and creates a hierarchy of restraint
that orders the relevant police conduct according to how severely it
restrains the suspect's freedom of movement. Admittedly, a degree of
subjectivity is involved in placing different kinds of police conduct in a
hierarchy. The proposal is that multiple agents are less restraining than
(perhaps yelled threats, which are less restraining than) handcuffs,
which are less restraining than being locked in a room, which is less
restraining than being held at gunpoint. But this is based in part on
intuition, and there is room for discussion here. Reasonable minds
may differ on whether being physically manhandled by a police officer
involves more force than being held in an isolated room, or being held
at gunpoint.
This Comment addresses this problem first by defining "restraint"
and second by defining each category of restraint that appears as a
point on the degree of restraint axis. However, the curve created by
141 See, for example, Smith, 3 F3d at 1095 ("We have held that a stop is reasonable when the
degree of suspicion is adequate in light of the degree and duration of the restraint.") (emphasis
added), citing United States v Chaidez, 919 F2d 1193,1198 (7th Cir 1990).
142 See Smith, 3 F3d at 1095-96.
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the fixed points on each axis is not a mathematical function of those
points. It would be impossible (and generally unnecessary) for courts
to calibrate precisely where each case should fall on the curve. Instead,
the rule is meant to give a firm sense of what degree of restraint each
category of behavior constitutes, so that courts may balance the degree of restraint with the duration of the detention and compare its
balancing to that in other cases.
CONCLUSION

This Comment proposes a new approach for determining Miranda
custody in cases involving ostensibly reasonable Terry stops. It argues
that courts should consider the degree of restraint in conjunction with
its duration, thus eliminating the confusion of the totality of the circumstances test currently used to determine custody. This should simplify
the custody determination and put cases into context. It will help courts
return to the original purposes of Miranda and Terry: to maintain individual dignity by protecting suspects from coercive interrogation, to
maintain privacy by protecting suspects from unreasonable government intrusion, and, at the same time, to allow police to do their jobs
safely.
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APPENDIX

Custody Cases

Degree

Duration of
Police
Encounter1,
(in minutes)
6145

Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 437 (1984)
Californiav Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1122 (1983)
United States v Thomas, 142 Fed Appx 896, 900 (6th
Cir 2005)

1
1
1

30
5

United States v Teemer, 394 F3d 59,66 (1st Cir 2005)
United States v St. Germain, 107 Fed Appx 91, 92-93
(9th Cir 2004)

1

30

1

20

United States v Martin, 95 Fed Appx 169, 177 (6th
Cir 2004)
United States v Newton, 369 F3d 659, 664 (2d Cir
2004) (finding custody)

1

5

3

1

United States v Acosta, 363 F3d 1141, 1149-50 (11th
Cir 2004)
United States v Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F3d 589, 592 (8th
Cir 2003)
United States v Swanson, 341 F3d 524, 529 (6th Cir
2003)
United States v Hernandez-Hernandez,327 F3d 703,
706 (8th Cir 2003)

2.5

20-30

2

30

2

10

2

10

United States v Kim, 292 F3d 969, 976 (9th Cir 2002)
(finding custody)
United States v Trueber, 238 F3d 79, 92 (1st Cir
2001)
United States v Speal, 166 F3d 350, 1998 US App
LEXIS 31656, *1 (10th Cir) (unpublished)

4

180

2.5

90

2

10

143 The numbers used to characterize degree of restraint
behaviors:
Degree of Restraint
Multiple agents
Yelled threats
Handcuffs
Locked room
Gunpoint

correlate to the following police

1
2
3
4
5

144 Duration is measured from the time the officer(s) first interacts with the suspect face to
face until the encounter ends, which is usually when the suspect is formally arrested.
145 Numbers in bold are estimates of the length of detention based on the facts as described
by the court, where the court did not state how long the detention lasted.
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
United States v Sullivan, 138 F3d 126, 129 (4th Cir
1998)
United States v Leong, 116 F3d 1474, 1997 US App
LEXIS 15480, *1 (4th Cir) (unpublished) (finding
custody)
Washington v Lambert, 98 F3d 1181, 1183-85, 1192
(9th Cir 1996) (finding custody)
United States v Ali, 68 F3d 1468, 1472 (2d Cir 1995)
(finding custody)
United States v Leshuk, 65 F3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir
1995)
United States v Johnson, 64 F3d 1120, 1123, 1126
(8th Cir 1995)
United States v Perdue,8 F3d 1455, 1459 (10th Cir
1993) (finding custody)
United States v Griffin, 7 F3d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir
1993) (finding custody)
United States v Smith, 3 F3d 1088, 1097 (7th Cir
1993) (finding custody)
United States v Richardson, 949 F2d 851, 859 (6th
Cir 1991) (finding custody)

20
2

5

2.5

15

2.5

10

2.5

15

3

20

2

20
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